Homomorphic encryption is an encryption scheme that allows computations to be evaluated on encrypted inputs without knowledge of their raw messages. Recently Ouyang et al. constructed a quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) scheme for Clifford circuits with statistical security (or information-theoretic security (IT-security)). It is desired to see whether an informationtheoretically-secure (ITS) quantum FHE exists. If not, what other nontrivial class of quantum circuits can be homomorphically evaluated with IT-security? We provide a limitation for the first question that an ITS quantum FHE necessarily incurs exponential overhead. As for the second one, we propose two QHE schemes for an enlarged class of the instantaneous quantum polynomial-time (IQP) circuits called IQP + . The first scheme TRIV follows directly from the one-time pad. The second scheme IQPP is constructed from a class of concatenated quantum stabilizer codes, whose logical X and Z operators act nontrivially on different sets of qubits.
I. INTRODUCTION
Homomorphic encryption is an encryption scheme that allows computations to be evaluated on encrypted inputs without knowledge of their raw messages. An encryption scheme is typically considered as a computational primitive, since an information-theoretically-secure (ITS for short) symmetric key encryption scheme can only securely encrypt messages of length at most the length of the secret key by Shannon's impossibility result [1, 2] . However, homomorphic encryptions can be interesting even with a bounded number of encrypted messages. Unfortunately, classical ITS fully homomorphic encryptions do not exist [3] . In this work we investigate the possibility of ITS symmetric-key homomorphic encryptions in the quantum setting. (The quantum analogues of Shannon's impossibility results also exist [4, 5] .)
In light of the negative result, we consider ITS symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) with bounded-message security. Such a QHE scheme is called information-theoretically N κ -bounded-message-secure (IT N κ -BMS). (Please see Def. 12.) We define the security with respect to adversaries holding a reference state with entanglement/correlation to the message state. (We use ρ M R to denote a density operator for the joint of the message (M) and reference (R) systems.) We also consider a weaker IT N κ -BMS definition involving no reference system. In Appendix A, we show that for IT security, the weak definition implies the above definition with a security loss exponential in the message length.
If a QHE scheme supports homomorphic evaluation of arbitrary quantum computation, it is called a quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) scheme. For this, homomorphic evaluation of a universal set of gates need to be implemented efficiently. It is known that Clifford gates together with the T gate are universal for quantum computation. The Clifford gates are composed of Hadamard, phase, and controlled-NOT CNOT = |0 0|⊗I +|1 1|⊗ X. (Pauli matrices are denoted by I, X, Y , and Z.)
In the computational setting, there has been an exciting development of QHE, initiated by the seminal work of Broadbent and Jeffery [6] , who constructed (computationally secure) QHE schemes for Clifford circuits with a small number of T gates. In a recent breakthrough, Dulek, Schaffner, and Speelman [7] constructed the first (leveled) QFHE. Very recently, Alagic, Dulek, Schaffner, and Speelman [8] showed how to further achieve verifiability for QFHE, which allows verification of correctness of homomorphically evaluated ciphertexts.
Back to the information-theoretic setting, can we build a QFHE scheme with IT-security? The possibility was first investigated by Ouyang et al. [9] and they showed that ITS QHE can be performed for Clifford circuits. On the other hand, it has been shown by Yu et al. [10] that QFHE with perfect security must incur exponential overhead. Herein, we extend the result to QFHE with imperfect IT-security by a reduction to the communication lower bound of quantum private information retrieval (QPIR) [11] with one server. (Please see Theorem 3.) This is also independently observed by Newman and Shi [12] .
The next question is whether we can have ITS QHE for any nontrivial class of circuits other than the Clifford circuits. In [9] a class of Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [13, 14] with transversal Clifford gates are used to construct an ITS QHE scheme. Quantum codes are used in the setting of fault-tolerant quantum computation [15] and quantum cryptography (e.g., [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] ). Therefore, if we replace those CSS codes by codes with a different transversal gate set, we obtain an ITS QHE scheme for another class of circuits. For example, the triorthogonal codes [21] have transversal CNOT, T , and control-control-phase gates. (However, it is known that transversal gates alone cannot be universal for quantum codes [22, 23] . See more discussion about transversal computation in [12] .)
In this paper we show how to do QHE for a class of quantum circuits, called IQP + , which is an enlarged class of the instantaneous quantum polynomial-time (IQP) circuits [24] (with additional X, Y , CNOT gates, and measurements in the Z basis). We will discuss a trivial scheme TRIV for IQP and a more involved scheme IQPP for IQP + , constructed from CSS codes [25] . (Note that the encrypted messages to IQP + are restricted to the those density operators without any single Pauli Z in the Pauli decomposition. See Def. 5 and the discussions there.) The formal result is given in Theorem 11. The trivial scheme TRIV can be extended for IQP + , using additional O(N 2 κ ) bits to track the effects of additional CNOTs in IQP + . Please see Theorem 7.
The notion of IQP computation was proposed in [24] , which is not universal for quantum computation. It is known that the class of IQP with postselection is equivalent to the class PP [26] . Moreover, IQP computations are difficult to simulate with classical computers [26] [27] [28] unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level. Currently it is hard to implement Shor's factoring algorithm [29] . Instead, nonuniversal circuits, such as IQP, are physically more feasible so that quantum supremacy could be demonstrated [28, [30] [31] [32] . It would be interesting to see what additional power the class of IQP + circuits can provide. In contrast, a Clifford circuit with input states in the computational basis can be classically simulated by the Gottesman-Knill theorem [33] .
This paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are given in the next section, including basics of quantum information processing and definitions of IQP and IQP + . In Sec. III we define QHE and its properties and then provide the limitation of IT-secure QFHE in Sec. IV. In Sec. V we discuss IQP + circuits and propose two QHE schemes TRIV and IQPP. Details can be found in Appendices C and D.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Quantum Information Processing
We give notation and briefly introduce basics of quantum mechanics here. Let L(H) denote the space of linear operators on a complex Hilbert space H. A quantum system is described by a density operator ρ ∈ L(H) that is positive semidefinite and with trace one trρ = 1. Let D(H) = {ρ ∈ L(H) : ρ ≥ 0, trρ = 1} be the set of density operators on a H. When ρ ∈ D(H) is of rank one, it is called a pure quantum state and we can write ρ = |ψ ψ| for some unit vector |ψ ∈ H, where ψ| = |ψ † is the conjugate transpose of |ψ . If ρ is not pure, it is called a mixed state and can be expressed as a convex combination of pure quantum states. The distance between two quantum states ρ and σ is
where ||X|| tr = tr √ X † X is the trace norm of an operator X. Associated with an m-qubit quantum system is a complex Hilbert space C 2 m with a computational basis {|v : v ∈ {0, 1} m }. Let {|0 , |1 } be an ordered basis for pure single-qubit states in C 2 . The Pauli matrices
form a basis of L(C 2 ). Then any single-qubit density operator ρ ∈ D(C 2 ) admits a Bloch sphere representation
where σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) and r = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) ∈ R 3 is called the Bloch vector of ρ such that r 2 1 + r 2 2 + r 2 3 ≤ 1. If ρ is pure, we have r 2 1 + r 2 2 + r 2 3 = 1. The evolution of a quantum state ρ ∈ D(H) is described by a quantum operation E : D(H) → D(H ) for some Hilbert spaces H and H . In particular, if the evolution is a unitary U , we have the evolved state E(ρ) = U ρU † . A quantum operation of several single-qubit Pauli operators on n different qubits simultaneously can be realized as an n-fold Pauli operator. Denote the n-fold Pauli group by
All elements in G n are unitary with eigenvalues ±1 and they either commute or anticommute with each other. An n-fold Pauli operator admits a binary representation that is irrelevant to its phase. For two binary n-tuples u, v ∈ {0, 1} n , define
where u = u 1 · · · u n and v = v 1 · · · v n . Thus any g ∈ G n can be expressed as g = i c Z u X v for some c ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and u, v ∈ {0, 1} n .
The set of unitary operators in L(C 2 n ) that preserve the n-fold Pauli group G n by conjugation is the Clifford group, which is generated by the Hadamard (H), phase (P ) and controlled-NOT (CNOT) gates:
The gates H, P , and CNOT are called Clifford gates. It is known that circuits composed of only Clifford gates are not universal; the Clifford gates together with any gate outside the Clifford group will do. For example, a candidate is the π/8 gate
These gates that involve only a few qubits are called elementary gates. Then a quantum circuit is composed of a sequence of elementary gates and possibly some quantum measurements. It is known that quantum measurements can be deferred to the end of a quantum circuit [34] and we will assume it is always the case in this paper. Also we consider only measurements in the Z basis (|0 , |1 ) and measurements in the X basis (
. We denote by C(ρ) the output of a quantum circuit C with input quantum state ρ by treating C as a quantum operation.
Finally we may use the notation X j to denote the operator
where n is the total number of qubits of the underlying system and can be inferred from the context. Similarly for Z j , H j , T j , and so on. Also the tensor product notation may be omitted sometimes. For example, we may write
In particular, we denote by C i X j , a CNOT gate with control qubit i and target qubit j; that is, X j is applied to qubit j if qubit i is in the state |1 .
III. DEFINITIONS
A quantum system is described by a density operator ρ that is a positive semidefinite operator over a complex Hilbert space H with trace one. Let D(H) be the set of density operators on H.
Definition 1.
A private-key quantum homomorphic qubit-encryption scheme F is defined by the following algorithms: 1) (Key generation) F.KeyGen: 1 κ → H sk × D(H evk ). The algorithm takes an input of a security parameter κ and outputs a classical private key sk (and possible some quantum evaluation key ρ evk ∈ D(H evk )).
2) (Encryption) F.Enc sk : D(C 2 ) → D(C). The algorithm takes sk and a single-qubit ρ ∈ D(C 2 ) as input and outputs a ciphertextρ ∈ D(C).
3) (Evaluation) F.Eval:
where C κ is a set of admissible quantum circuits for F and the security parameter κ, M κ is the maximum number of input qubits for C κ , and M is the set of corresponding homomorphic measurement outcomes. 4) (Decryption) F.Dec sk : D(C) × M → D(C 2 ) × {0, 1}. If the measurement outcome µ ∈ M is trivial, the algorithm takes sk and σ ∈ D(C) as input and outputs a single-qubit quantum stateσ ∈ D(C 2 ). Otherwise, the algorithm takes sk and µ as input and outputs a bit of measurement outcome.
-(Correctness) F is homomorphic for C = ∪ κ C κ if there exists a negligible function η(κ) such that for sk, ρ evk ← F.KeyGen(1 κ ), C ∈ C κ on M κ qubits, and ρ ∈ D(C 2 Mκ ),
-(Compactness) F is compact for C = ∪ κ C κ if there exists a polynomial p in κ such that for any C ∈ C κ , the circuit complexity of applying F.Dec to the output of F.Eval C is at most p(κ).
A QHE scheme is fully homomorphic if it is compact and homomorphic for all quantum circuits generated by a universal set of quantum gates.
Definition 2.
A QHE scheme F is information-theoretically N κ -bounded-message-secure (IT N κ -BMS) if there exists a negligible function (κ), such that for every security parameter κ and
where Φ denotes the corresponding quantum operation of the underlying algorithm.
We use ρ M R to denote a density operator for the joint of the message (M) and reference (R) systems. This definition says that two encrypted quantum states of an IT-secure QHE are statistically indistinguishable.
IV. LIMITATION
Here we present a negative result for ITS QFHE by a reduction to the communication lower bound of quantum private information retrival (QPIR) with one server. In an (n, m, p) QPIR problem with a single server, Alice (the server) has an n-bit data x and Bob wishes to learn the ith entry x i with probability p > 1/2 by exchanging m qubits without revealing the index i to Alice. Nayak [35, 36] showed that
where H(p) is the binary entropy function. (See also [37] for an extension of this result.) We show that the existence of an ITS QFHE would contradict Nayak's communication lower bound.
Proof. Assume there is an IT N κ -BMS QFHE scheme F for N κ = ω(log κ). We show that it leads to a QPIR protocol that violate the communication lower bound.
Suppose that F encrypts one qubit to a ciphertext of at most p(κ) qubits and κ is sufficiently large such that
Suppose Alice holds a database x ∈ {0, 1} n and Bob wants to retrieve information x i from Alice by using F without revealing i. Let C x ∈ C κ be a quantum circuit that takes an input i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and outputs x i .
The QPIR protocol is as follows. Suppose Bob wants to query an index i * of log n bits. Using the QFHE algorithm F, he generates a key set sk, ρ evk ← F.KeyGen(1 κ ) and then produces the cipher state F.Enc ⊗ log n sk (|i * ), which is of p(κ) log n qubits. Then he sends it to Alice, together with ρ evk . After computing
Alice sends ρ back to Bob. By the security of IT N κ -BMS F, Bob does not reveal his desired objective to Alice. If Alice honestly does the homomorphic evaluation, Bob would learn x i * with probability at least 1 − η(κ). Thus we have an (n, p(κ), 1 − η(κ)) QPIR protocol with IT-security inherited from F. Note that only p(κ) qubits are required in communication, which contradicts Nayak's lower bound (3) that at least 0.9n = 90p(κ) qubits are required.
Observe that in this proof Alice only needs to homomorphically evaluates a classical selection function. Thus the impossibility proof also rules our ITS QHE schemes for all classical circuits.
V.
IQP + CIRCUITS IQP circuits are proposed in [24, 26] . We call a gate diagonal in the computational basis (|0 , |1 ) a diagonal gate.
Definition 4. An IQP circuit is a quantum circuit consisting of diagonal gates. The input state is the product state of some qubits in |+ and the output is the measurement outcomes on a specified subset of the qubits in the X basis (|+ , |− ).
Definition 5. An IQP + circuit on N qubits is composed of diagonal gates, X, Y , CNOT, and possibly some measurements in the X or Z basis at the end. The input is a product state of some qubits in
Remark 6. For the homomorphic encryption of IQP (IQP + ) circuits, we define a more general input space:
That is, D xy (C 2 N ⊗ R) is a collection of density operators that do not have any single Z operator in the message part of their Pauli decompositions.
Note that it is always possible to shift the X, Y and CN OT gates to the end of the circuit (before the measurements), since they preserve the diagonal gates by conjugation. Thus we may consider an IQP + circuit as an IQP circuit followed by classical post-processing with only NOT and CNOT gates.
A.
Trivial QHE for IQP
Observe that an input qubit of a IQP or IQP + circuit lies in the xy-plane, i.e., |ψ = |0 + e iθ |1 , which can be protected by a Z one-time pad. A trivial QHE scheme TRIV for IQP is defined as follows.
Let IQP N be the set of IQP circuits with at most N input qubits. Suppose a client asks a server to compute a quantum circuit C ∈ IQP N on an N -qubit input state ρ ∈ D xy (C 2 N ).
The symmetric-key QHE scheme TRIV is as follows.
, where k = 3N κ and h is uniformly drawn from a family of k-independent hash functions H (no evaluation key here).
2) TRIV.Enc:
and r is a random binary k-tuple (encryption randomness). For an N -qubit input state, each qubit is encrypted respectively.
3) TRIV.Eval:
Evaluation is trivial for diagonal gates since they commute with the encryption. Measurements in the X basis are also trivial and the outcomes are protected by the Z one-time pads.
We remark that TRIV can be adapted for IQP + circuits. Since CNOT do not commute with Z and a Z on the target qubit will propagate to the control qubit through the CNOT, we use an additional binary N × N matrix to record these propagation so that the one-time pads can be correctly updated. Steps 3) and 4) are modified as follows.
Evaluation is straightforward for the gates in IQP + . Let W be the N × N binary identity matrix. If a CNOT with control qubit i and target qubit j is performed,
Therefore, we have the following theorem and its proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 7. For any polynomial N κ in a security parameter κ, there exists an IT N κ -BMS QHE scheme for IQP + circuits with respect to the input space D xy (C 2 Nκ ⊗ R) with a reference system.
B. QHE for IQP +
Now we propose a QHE scheme IQPP for IQP + circuits based on a family of concatenated Steane code with a [ [6, 2] ] code Q 6 . Q 6 is defined by the four stabilizer generators
, and its logical operators areX 1 = X 1 X 5 X 6 ,X 2 = X 1 X 2 ,Z 1 = Z 1 Z 2 , andZ 2 = Z 2 Z 3 Z 4 . We use U i to denote a single-qubit operator U on the ith qubit. Note that in IQPP, we will operate on the first logical qubit of Q 6 , while the second logical qubit is initialized in the maximally-mixed state (MMS) 1 2 I. Discussions about the quantum error-correcting code Q 6 and the Steane code are detailed in Appendix C.
Motivated by the implementation of T in [38] , we observed that the implementation of a diagonal gate can be done by involving only a subset of qubits, called support. If the parity of the support qubits is known, the diagonal gate can be implemented correctly. For example, Fig. 6 implements the logical T on the first logical qubit of Q 6 . Proposition 8. A diagonal gate D on the first logical qubit of a codeword of Q 6 can be implemented byD 1 = (C 1 X 2 )D 2 (C 1 X 2 ), where C i X j means a CNOT with control qubit i and target qubit j.
Remark 9.
A logical diagonal gate involving more codewords of Q 6 can be implemented similarly by decoding first the parity of each codeword, performing the diagonal gate, and then reversing the decoding.
However, revealing this support will induce an attack of logical Z measurement. Fortunately, this is not harmful since the input qubits of an IQP + circuit lie in the xy-plane. Another issue is that for some codes, the logical Z and X have the same support, such as the Steane code, so that a logical X attack exists simultaneously, precluding the encryption of any quantum information. Thus Q 6 is chosen so that the supports ofX 1 andZ 1 are different. So the main idea of IQPP is to hide the locations of the fifth and sixth qubits by randomly permuting them with additional maximally-mixed states (MMSs).
To get an infinite family of codes, we concatenate Q 6 (top-level) with l layers of the Steane code to obtain a [[6·7 l , 2]] code Q (l) 6 , since the Clifford gates can be transversally implemented in the Steane code [15] . Let U (l) 6 , D (l) 6 be a pair of encoder and (efficient) decoder of Q (l) 6 . For security, each ancilla is initialized in MMS and the resulting encoding procedure is called noisy encoding.
Let IQP + N be the set of IQP + circuits with at most N input qubits. Suppose a client asks a server to compute a quantum circuit C ∈ IQP + N on an N -qubit input state ρ ∈ D xy (C 2 N ).
Our symmetric-key QHE scheme IQPP is as follows.
1) IQPP.KeyGen : 1 κ → S 2m , where m = 2 · 7 l and l = log(5N κ )/ log 7. A permutation π ∈ S 2m is uniformly chosen as the symmetric key.
2) IQPP.Enc π : D(C 2 ) → D(C 4m ). Encryption is done by a noisy encoding of U (l) 6 followed by a random permutation π on the last m qubits with additional m MMSs. For an N -qubit input state, each qubit is encrypted respectively.
is the set of measurement outcomes. The homomorphic operation of a diagonal gate is similar to Prop. 8 and Remark 20, but with Q (l) 6 logical operations. A transversal CNOT between two codewords clearly implements an encrypted CNOT [15] . Encrypted X (Y ) is simply the tensor product of the logical X (Y ) of Q (l) 6 with additional X ⊗m (Y ⊗m ), i.e., they are bitwise implemented on the permuted qubits. Finally, encrypted measurements in the Z (X) basis are simply bitwise measurements in the Z (X) basis on the corresponding qubits.
Decryption is done by first applying the inverse permutations on the quantum state and the measurement outcomes, and throwing out the garbage qubits and outcomes. Then apply D (l) 6 to the quantum codewords or apply a classical decoding to the measurement outcomes if an encrypted measurement is performed.
To prove the IT-security of IQPP, we need the following lemma, which results from noisy encoding and a randomly qubit-permutation with MMSs. The proof is similar to [9, Lemma 4] . This lemma says that security can be achieved by permuting only the last 1/3 qubits of a codeword of Q where ρ, ρ ∈ D xy (C 2 N ). Then
By Lemma 10, given an evaluation circuit on N qubits, a quantum code of large enough length 6 · 7 l should be used in the scheme and each codeword should be permuted with 2 · 7 l MMSs so that the trace distance of two encrypted states is small. In conclusion, we have the following theorem. The proofs of Lemma 10 and Theorem 11 are given in Appendix D.
Theorem 11. For any polynomial N κ in a security parameter κ, there exists an IT N κ -BMS QHE scheme for IQP + circuits with respect to the input space D xy (C 2 Nκ ⊗ R) with a reference system.
Appendix A: Information Theoretical Security
Below is a weaker definition of IT N κ -BMS with no reference system involved.
Definition 12.
A QHE scheme F is weak information-theoretically N κ -bounded-message-secure (IT N κ -BMS) if there exists a negligible function (κ), such that for every security parameter κ and ρ, ρ ∈ D(C 2 Nκ ),
It is clear that Def. 12 implies Def. 12 by choosing a trivial reference system. We will show that a weak IT N κ -BMS encryption scheme is an IT N κ -BMS encryption scheme with additional loss in the security error. Then we will show that our QHE scheme IQPP is weak IT N κ -BMS, and hence IT N κ -BMS.
Theorem 13. If F is a weak IT N κ -BMS encryption scheme with security error at most (κ), then F is IT N κ -BMS with security error at most 2 2Nκ (κ).
Proof. Now suppose that F is a IT N κ -BMSQHE scheme by Def. 12.
In general, a bipartite state ρ AR can be expressed as ρ AR = i,j |i j| ⊗ σ i,j , where σ i,j = σ † j,i and tr(σ i,j ) = tr(σ j,i ) ≤ 1. Similarly, let ρ AR = i,j |i j| ⊗ σ i,j and assume tr A (ρ AR ) = tr A (ρ AR ).
Next we upper bound the three terms, respectively.
1. Consider the first term (and the third term can be treated similarly):
where (a) is because A tr = tr √ A † A = tr(A) for A ≥ 0. 2. Now consider the second term:
where the assumption tr A (ρ AR ) = tr A (ρ AR ) is used. Thus
Corollary 14. If F is a weak IT N κ -BMS encryption scheme for input space D xy (C Nκ ) with security error at most (κ), then F is IT N κ -BMS for input space D xy (C Nκ ⊗ R) with security error at most 2 2Nκ (κ).
Appendix B: Proof of the security of TRIV Theorem 7 (restated). For any polynomial N κ in a security parameter κ, there exists an IT N κ -BMS QHE scheme for IQP + circuits with respect to the input space D xy (C 2 Nκ ⊗ R) with a reference system.
Proof. Note that TRIV has perfect correctness. Compactness is also straightforward. We prove the security as follows.
Since h is a uniformly chosen N κ -independent hash function, h(r 1 )h(r 2 ) · · · h(r Nκ ) is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} Nκ for distinct r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r Nκ . Consequently, the trace norm (B1) is zero. Now we consider the trace norm (B2). Since Pr{r i = r j } = 2 −k , by union bound,
By Corollary 14,
Appendix C: Homomorphic Computation on Stabilizer Codes
We begin with a brief introduction of stabilizer codes and then discuss each function block that will be used in our scheme IQPP in the following subsections. The complete scheme of IQPP will be presented in Sec. D.
Stabilizer Codes
Suppose S is an Abelian subgroup of the n-fold Pauli group G n with independent generators g 1 , . . . , g n−k and −I ⊗n / ∈ S. Then S defines an [[n, k]] quantum stabilizer code
which is a subspace of C 2 n of dimension 2 k [34, 39] . The vectors in Q(S) are called codewords of Q(S). The elements in S are called the stabilizers of Q(S). The vector space Q(S) is isomorphic to the state space of k logical qubits. In this section, a logical operator U on the jth logical qubit will be denoted byŪ j and a logical qubit will be denoted by |ψ . Quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [13, 14] are a class of stabilizer codes with stabilizer generators of the form Z v or X u for v, u ∈ {0, 1} n . Herein we construct a family of concatenated CSS codes and propose a QHE scheme IQPP that admits the evaluation of IQP + circuits. In particular, our codes are obtained by concatenating multiple layers of the [ [7, 1] ] Steane code [14] with a [ [6, 2] ] CSS code Q 6 at the top-level.
Steane Code
Consider the initial state
where |ψ ∈ C 2 is an arbitrary information qubit, and |0 and |+ are ancillas. This initial state has six independent stabilizer generators X 2 , X 3 , X 4 , Z 5 , Z 6 , and Z 7 and its logical Pauli operators are X 1 and Z 1 that modify the information qubit |ψ . An encoding circuit of the Steane code is shown in Fig. 2 
Thus the logical Pauli operators areX
The corresponding stabilizer generators are
Clifford gates can be transversally implemented in the Steane code, as mentioned previously [15] . The logical measurement in the Z basis is by a classical decoding of the bitwise single-qubit measurement outcomes in the Z basis, and similar for the logical measurement in the X basis. Let
be the rotation aboutẑ axis by an arbitrary angle θ. Let
Next we describe how the logical R(θ) and CR(θ) gates are implemented in this paper.
Proposition 15. The logical R(θ) gate in the Steane code can be implemented bȳ
Proof. For c = c 1 · · · c 7 ∈ {0, 1} 7 , let a c = c 2 c 3 c 7 and b c = c 1 c 4 c 5 c 6 . Observe that
where wt (a) is the number of nonzero bits of a. Consequently,
The circuit in Fig. 3 is used to implement the logical R(θ) gate, which generalizes the implementation of the logical T gate in [38] . Similarly, the circuit in Fig. 4 is used to implement the logical CR(θ) gate. Proposition 16. The logical CR(θ) gate between two codewords (qubits numbered from 1 to 14) of the Steane code can be implemented by
Remark 17. A logical diagonal gate involving more codewords of the Steane code can be implemented similarly by decoding first the parity of each codeword, performing the diagonal gate, and then reversing the decoding.
[[6, 2]] CSS Code Q6
A [ [6, 2] ] quantum code encodes two information qubits in six physical qubits. Suppose we have the following 6-qubit initial state where |ψ 1 and |ψ 2 are two arbitrary information qubits in C 2 and the ancilla states (|+ , |0 ) are chosen appropriately. The stabilizer generators of |Ψ are X 3 , X 4 , Z 5 , and Z 6 , and its logical Pauli operators are X 1 , Z 1 and X 2 , Z 2 .
Consider a Clifford unitary encoding operator U 6 as shown in Fig. 5 such that Our [ [6, 2] ] code Q 6 is defined by the four stabilizer generators
and the logical Pauli operators areX
FIG. 6. The circuit that implementsR1(θ) for the [ [6, 2] ] code Q6. Note that only the first two qubits are involved.
of Q 6 in the computational basis are
which are derived by |00 = 1
, and |11 =X 1X2 |00 . Note that in IQPP, we will implement logical operations on the first logical qubit of Q 6 , while the state of the second logical qubit is not concerned. (More precisely, the second logical qubit is chosen to be the maximally-mixed state 1 2 I for a security issue.) In particular, Q 6 is chosen so that the supports ofX 1 andZ 1 are different. A transversal CNOT between two codewords implements a logical CNOT from the control codeword to the target codeword since Q 6 is a CSS code [15] . Again, the logical measurement in the Z (or X) basis is by a classical decoding of the bitwise single-qubit measurement outcomes in the Z (or X) basis.
The logical R 1 (θ) and CR(θ) between the first logical qubits of two codewords are shown in Figs. 6 and 7 , respectively.
Proposition 18. The logical R(θ) gate on the first logical qubit of a codeword of Q 6 can be implemented bȳ
Proof. Let a ∈ {0, 1} 2 , b ∈ {0, 1} 4 and their concatenation be denoted by ab ∈ {0, 1} 6 . Observe that
where, again, wt (a) is the number of nonzero bits of a. Consequently,
Similarly, we have the following proposition for CR(θ) gate of Q.
Proposition 19. The logical CR(θ) gate between two codewords (qubits numbered from 1 to 12) of Q 6 can be implemented by
Remark 20. A logical diagonal gate involving more codewords of Q 6 can be implemented similarly by decoding first the parity of each codeword, performing the diagonal gate, and then reversing the decoding. 
The circuit that implements a logical CR(θ) gate between the first logical qubits of two codewords of the [ [6, 2] ] code Q6.
Concatenated Quantum Codes
To achieve security asymptotically, we need an infinite code family. A useful method to construct a large code is by concatenating small codes. Suppose 
Let U (l) 6 denote the Clifford encoder of Q (l) 6 and let D (l) 6 be an efficient decoder (a general quantum operation) of Q (l) 6 . The logical CNOT gate between two codewords is also transversally implemented. Now a rotation aboutẑ is implemented as in Proposition 19, with the gates being replaced by the logical gates of a lower-layer code, recursively. For example, the R(θ) gate in Fig. 6 is implemented by the circuit in Fig. 3 in an l-layer concatenated version. Let R (l) (θ) denote the rotation of the first logical qubit of Q (l) 6 aboutẑ. Let CR (l) (θ) denote the CR(θ) between two codewords of Q (l) 6 .
Noisy Encoding
Recall that by definition, the eigenvalues of the stabilizer generators of a clean codeword are all +1's. In a task of homomorphic encryption, it is assumed that there are no communication errors on the physical qubits. To some extent, using clean codewords may reveal information about the encrypted qubits. Thus random noises are introduced to modify these eigenvalues. This is done by padding the ancillas in (C3): |+ is replaced by
= ρ.
Permutation on the Qubits
The information-theoretic security of the homomorphic encryption in [9] comes from the random qubit-permutation on the noisily-encoded quantum codeword (C13) with additional maximally-mixed states ( 1 2 I)'s. A similar manner will appear in our scheme. The permutation operator will be introduced here.
Let S m denote the symmetric group of permutations on {1, 2, . . . , m}. A permutation that exchanges two elements x, y ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} and keeps all the others fixed is called a transposition and is denoted by τ (x, y). It is known that every permutation can be decomposed as a product of transpositions.
Two qubits can be swapped by the circuit shown in Fig. 8 . Let SWAP(i, j) denote the circuit that swapps the states of qubits i and j. It is obvious that performing SWAP(i, j) is equivalent to applying transition τ (i, j) on the qubit indices. Given a permutation π = i τ (a i , b i ) ∈ S a , we can define a corresponding permutation operator on the m-qubit space by
which can be implemented by a series of SWAPs. To prove the information-theoretically security of IQPP, we need the following lemma, which results from noisy encoding and a randomly qubit-permutation with maximally-mixed states. The proof is similar to [9, Lemma 4] . This lemma says that security can be achieved by permuting only the last 1/3 qubits of a codeword of Q (l) 6 with sufficient maximally-mixed states.
Lemma 10 (restated). Let N, m, l be positive integers and m = 2 · 7 l . Supposẽ
where ρ, ρ ∈ D xy (C 2 N ). Then
Proof. We begin with some notation in this proof. Let 
Thus ρ can be expressed as
where a r ∈ C with |a r | ≤ 1 and r[10 3m−1 ] ∈ {0, 1, 2} N ×3m . Similarly,
Thus by (C14),
where E r ∈ {0, 1, 2} N ×(2m) depends on the encoding of σ r .
It is known that the trace distance of two quantum states is an upper bound on the difference of their probabilities of obtaining the same measurement outcome [34] . By Lemma 10, given an evaluation circuit on N qubits, a quantum code of large enough length 3m = 6 · 7 l should be used in the scheme and each codeword should be permuted with sufficiently many m maximally-mixed states so that the trace distance of two encrypted states is small for security.
Theorem 11 (restated). For any polynomial N κ in a security parameter κ, there exists an IT N κ -BMS QHE scheme for IQP + circuits with respect to a message space with a reference system D xy (C 2 Nκ ⊗ R).
Proof. Consider the QHE scheme IQPP.
• (Security) Recall the Stirling's approximation √ 2πnn n e −n < n! < √ 2πnn n e −n+1 .
We have 2m m ≥ (2m) 2m+1/2 e 2 √ 2πm m+1/2 m m+1/2 = √ 1 e 2 √ πm 2 2m .
For ρ, ρ ∈ D xy (C 2 Nκ ), by Lemma 10, E π {IQPP.Enc π (ρ)} − E π {IQPP.Enc π (ρ )} tr ≤2e(3 Nκ − 1)(πm) 1/4 2 −m
By Corollary 14, IQPP is IT N κ -BMS with security error at most e 5 N −1/4 κ 2 −6Nκ with respect to the message space with a reference system D xy (C 2 Nκ ⊗ R).
• (Correctness) From the construction of IQPP, for C ∈ IQP + κ with input ρ ∈ D xy (C 2 ) ⊗Nκ , it is clear that for any security parameter N κ , and π ← IQPP.KeyGen(1 Nκ ), we have E π {IQPP.Dec π (IQPP.Eval(C, IQPP.Enc π (ρ)))} − E π {C(ρ)} tr = 0, since there is no randomness except the measurement outcomes and the distribution of measurement outcomes remains the same after encryption. Thus IQPP is homomorphic for IQP + .
• (Compactness) F is compact if there exists a polynomial p such that for any C ∈ C Nκ F , the circuit complexity of applying F.Dec to the output of F.Eval C is at most p(N κ ).
Given a QHE task on IQP + circuits with N κ input qubits, the decryption algorithm IQPP.Dec performs N κ permutations and at most N κ classical decoding operations, and at most N κ quantum decoding operations. Each permutation takes at most 2 · 7 l + m = O(N κ ) CNOTs and consequently these permutations take a total of O(N 2 κ ) CNOTs. Since there are no physical errors, the errors introduced by noisy encoding are correctable errors. Thus each classical or quantum decoding takes O(poly(n)) = O(poly(N κ )) steps. Consequently the total complexity of performing IQPP.Dec is O(poly(N κ )), which is independent of the circuit size. Thus IQPP is compact.
